|RELATED TOPICS:||Government and Democracy|
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This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. A political agency model with imperfect information is modeled in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors. It is found find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort, that is, a disciplining effect. A positive but weaker selection effect is also found. According to the model, the widely-used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4.2 percent compared to a one-term regime and better voter information about the effort of governors would further increase voter welfare by up to 0.5 percent.
This paper contributes to an agenda that views the effects of policies and institutional reforms as dependent on the structure of political incentives for national and subnational political actors. The paper studies political incentive structures at the subnational level and the mechanisms whereby they affect national-level politics and policymaking at the national level in Argentina, a highly dec ... (View publication)
Most policy analyses and academic papers deal with finding the combination of policies that may bring about the best development outcomes. However, in the long run, it is the features of public policies that seem to matter for explaining development outcomes. Unfortunately, Latin America and the Caribbean lags behind other regions in the quality of the features of public policies. Policy feat ... (View publication)
This policy brief takes stock of the research on government capabilities undertaken at the Inter-American Development Bank, highlights the relevance of government capabilities for generating better policies and higher levels of development, summarizes what has been learned about the origins of those capabilities, suggests avenues for further exploration, and derives lessons (and caveats) for insti ... (View publication)
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